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COPYRIGHT INSIDE THE LAW LIBRARY
By David Vaver*
What follows is based on a talk given at a luncheon meeting of the Toronto As-
sociation of Law Librarians at the Park Plaza hotel in Toronto on November 23,
1994. An earlier version appeared in 14:3 TALL Newsletter 1 (February 1995).
Professor Vaver claims no copyright in either version.
propose to talk about copyright law as it affects law practice. Two recent cases are
of interest. The first, R. v. Laurier Office Mart Inc. (now reported in (1994) 58
C.P.R.(3d) 403), was decided in Ottawa on November 15, 1994, by Judge Ratushny
of Ontario's provincial court. A copyshop was acquitted of seven charges of criminal
copyright infringement for issuing course kits for courses at Ottawa University. The
kits had been assembled by university professors using articles and chapters from
books not written by them, and handed by them to the copyshop for copying as or-
dered by students in their courses. This was an easy case for the RCMP to investi-
gate because one of its officers was taking a course at the university for which he had
already gone and purchased materials.
The prosecution was instigated by CANCOPY, no doubt as a cheap way of getting
the attention of copyshop owners. It had that effect for the copyshop charged: since
nobody likes being prosecuted, the shop took a licence from CANCOPY and has
since been paying royalties on copies it makes. The larger threat to other copyshops
didn't quite materialize. After all, it is one thing to threaten and quite another thing
to carry out your threats successfully. The case is presently on appeal, but I will dis-
cuss the first instance decision in more detail later.
The Ottawa decision does not, of course, mean that a civil action for infringement
brought by the copyright owners would not have succeeded. If competently pre-
sented, it would have had a fighting chance of success, as the U.S. decision in Amer-
ican Geophysical Union v. Texaco (now reported 37 F.3d 881 (2nd Circ., 1994), de-
cided in New York by a federal appeal court on October 28,1994, suggests. The court
decided that scientific researchers in Texaco labs could not routinely photocopy for
their files entire articles from scientific journals routed to them by Texaco's library.
Texaco had either to buy more subscriptions or to pay a royalty to the Copyright
Clearance Center for each copy made.
In Texaco, the authors had transferred their copyrights free to the publisher, so the
publisher was the copyright owner. In law publishing, at least in Canada and Com-
monwealth countries, copyright in articles appearing in periodicals usually remains
with the author. Few authors are heard to complain about their articles being copied:
they seem happy anyone would bother. As university budgets tighten, university ad-
ministrators are getting twitchy about the situation. They see their faculty writing ar-
ticles free for publishers who end up charging them for journals and for using articles
written by their own faculty. In future, academics may be pressured not to assign their
copyrights to publishers; some universities are talking about insisting on having the
copyright themselves and sharing proceeds with their professors.
Meanwhile, the implications of Texaco for U.S. law libraries are these:
* What the authors of journal articles want or expect others to do with the arti-
cles is irrelevant once they have assigned their copyrights to a publisher: it is
the publisher's interests that have to be considered.
* Professor Vaver teaches at the Osgoode Hall Law School at York University in Toronto.
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* If a business or other organization subscribes to a journal and routes the jour-
nal regularly to its employees, they may or may not be entitled to take copies for
themselves:
* they cannot copy if their aim is "archival" (i.e., to have the article on the shelf
for later reference) and if there is also a reasonably quick and effective means of
buying the right to reproduce the article, like the Copyright Clearance Center or
an effective permissions department run by the journal's publisher. If these
means do not exist, the employee may be entitled to copy the article for later ref-
erence.
* the employees may copy articles if they are researching that particular topic
and need the article for that research. Even then, they should scan the article
and see what they really need. They should not copy bits they don't reasonably
think they'll need.
Whether Texaco applies in Canada is far from clear. The U.S. law on "fair use" dif-
fers from ours; the social and cultural contexts of the two countries differ; moreover,
it is uncertain how strong a precedent Texaco is even in the U.S. One of the three
judges in the case issued a strong dissent, saying the majority's opinion did the cause
of research no good at all. Research proceeds incrementally, one researcher building
her work on another's; getting copyright clearances every time one comes across
something that may be a lead impedes the cause of acquiring more knowledge and
generating new ideas, the purpose of having copyright laws in the first place.
Cases like these make it an interesting time to be a law librarian. Faced with pres-
sure from publishers and their collecting societies, firms, law societies and univer-
sities have set or are in the process of setting policies on copying practices. The air
bristles with threats of litigation and demands for licence fees by publishers keenly
honing their sense of grievance. It's a good time to think about the present and fu-
ture state of copyright.
A law library typically contains law texts, law reports and periodicals, digests, leg-
islation, reports from governmental and international organizations. There are also
links to electronic databases, frequently replicated in the separate offices of users,
be they lawyers or law professors. Much of this material is subject to copyright, but
much is not.
Consider first government material. Governments have copyright in material pub-
lished by their civil servants and government boards. In the early 1980s, James
Lorimer's firm published a one-volume paperback abridgment of a multi-volume re-
port on petroleum pricing issued by the federal Director of Competition. The federal
government got an injunction against him, and he had to hand over all his stock and
profits made from sales. Lorimer had offered the government the going royalty rate
of 8% royalty on retail sales (which the court eventually awarded as damages on past
sales), but the government stalled on giving permission. This was precisely why
Lorimer had gone ahead before asking permission: he hadn't wanted to wait until the
bureaucrats finished pushing their paper round, because by the time someone
okayed his project, Lorimer's only hope may have been that his book would be as-
signed reading in a course on Canadian history.
In the U.S., federal and state legislation and law reports and other publications of
the U.S. government have no copyright there and are assumed to have no copyright
in Canada either. This is justified on the basis that the laws belong to the people, not
their governments.
This democratic ideal does not seem to be widely shared by this country's rulers
where - taking a leaf from Britain - the federal and provincial governments claim
copyright in the legislation and judgments, although they seem little concerned
about what copying goes on in law offices and law libraries. No judge in Canada has
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ever decided these claims are supportable in law, although there is a decision in Aus-
tralia in 1938 where the New South Wales government won an injunction preventing
Butterworths from copying the N.S.W statutes. The Crown had this right either
through its prerogative power (the same power it uses to make war) or because it
owned copyright in the legislation.
The reason for the Crown's having the right is said to be to ensure accuracy - the
same reason that justified the British Crown's claim to control publication of the au-
thorized version of the English and Scottish Bibles. The fear was someone might
publish the Ten Commandments with a few choice revisions: miss out a "not" here
and there, and where would society be? (Perhaps a great deal more interesting, but
certainly not the exemplar of "peace, order and good government" the British upper
classes expected of others, if not of themselves.) This reason assumes the infallibil-
ity of government printers and the relative sloppiness of private sector publishers;
neither charge is entirely true today.
More recently, governments have tried to justify their claims on straight fiscal
grounds: to make money off the commercial publication of statutes. At least within
the federal bureaucracy, there is a lively debate about the propriety of this between
the supporters of the treasury board and those officials who believe in open gov-
ernment. So far, abstract democratic ideals have found it hard to grapple with a men-
tality favouring deficit reduction and "user pays" principles. (There may be a better
reason for the government to have copyright, which I shall come to in a moment.)
The federal and some provincial governments also claim copyright in the judg-
ments judges and administrative tribunals deliver. Other claimants have joined the
queue: some judges have, in the past, said they own copyright in their judgments;
private reporters who take down oral reasons delivered from the bench also have
claimed copyright in their reports, just as journalists do for their transcription of in-
terviews. Claims like this bothered one British Columbian appeal judge enough for
him to comment, in a case having nothing to do with Crown copyright, that it may be
"contrary to public policy" for anyone to claim copyright in a judge's reasons. Pre-
sumably, the judge thought this material - which is not likely spontaneously to be-
come as popular as the latest Danielle Steele or Stephen King ripper - should have
the widest possible distribution. (B.C Jockey Club v. Standen (1985) 8 C.P.R.(3d) 283,
by Hutcheon J.A., concurring). Needless to say, that comment has not itself been
widely disseminated by copyright claimants.
Ironically, nothing in the Copyright Act says the federal or provincial governments
are themselves bound to observe copyright. So, on the one hand, while claiming the
copyright law allows them to stop others from publishing their works, they see noth-
ing incongruous in ignoring the copyright law to copy whatever they like, whenever
they like. True, the federal government recently agreed to pay CANCOPY royalties
for photocopying, but more out of moral compunction than legal obligation.
All this may be cleared up in the pending copyright reforms, although this may be
too much to hope for. In principle, we may not mind governments having copyright
in judgments and legislation if they simultaneously provide the fullest and freest ac-
cess to this material. The copyright law might include a provision giving publishers
a non-exclusive licence on condition that they would not claim copyright for their
compilation, headnotes, summaries, etc., except against competing publishers who
copy slavishly. Everyone else would have fullest access. Legal publishers might then
realize something they have not always fully appreciated: that they are in a business
that is impressed with a public interest. They are entitled to protection from unfair
competition, but nothing more.
In the private sector, any work the author of which died before 1944 is now out of
copyright, since the right lasts only for the life of the author plus 50 years. The whole
work may be copied for any purpose including commercial publication.
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Although more modern texts have copyright, this is tempered for works like books
of forms that invite lawyers freely to copy the forms found there for use in their prac-
tice. That's the purpose of the book and, in law, the copyright owner extends an im-
plied licence to users to use the forms in that way (unless they expressly qualify that
licence by some prominent notice in the book). The implied licence does not, of
course, allow anyone to publish the forms commercially.
For law journals, in Canada most authors retain the copyright in their articles. Pub-
lishers get only a licence to print. The order in which articles are placed in a journal
is too trivial to produce a separate copyright.
As for law reports, I have already mentioned the actual judgments: I query whether
there is or should be any copyright in these, and even if there is, public policy rea-
sons favour the fullest use of and access to the judgments. At common law, public
policy considerations like this may override copyright. As for catchlines, headnotes,
and indexes, the publisher who prepares has copyright in them. Some years ago,
West Publishing was able successfully to claim a copyright in its page numbers and
case citations, but this is doubtful law both in the U.S. and elsewhere. There may be
something in common between the work of a Kipling or Swift and the work of the in-
serter of page numbers in a book, but the page numberer would not be admitted to
a writers' union on the basis of this qualification.
Whether copyright exists in the selection of cases made for an issue or volume of
the law reports is doubtful: give any 20 lawyers the guidelines for inclusion and most
would come up with pretty much the same selection. This suggests there is little
originality involved, and anyway having a copyright would be relevant only if some-
body wanted to copy all or most of the selection. Typically, this would be a compet-
ing publisher, and it seems reasonable to protect Canada Law Book from having
someone else, wanting to start a rival publication to the Dominion Law Reports, save
money on editorial staff and allow them simply to copy its selection of cases. It
seems equally reasonable for anyone wanting to make a photocopy replacement of
a tattered volume of the D.L.R. to get the publisher's consent or buy a replacement
copy.
In the result, publishers can object to people who copy their headnotes, digests,
and cumulative indexes like those at the back of the Dominion Law Reports, but not
the alphabetical index at the front, which is mechanical and probably produced by
pushing a sort button on a computer. Publishers can object to libraries copying
these as a routine service for their lawyers and sending the copies round when the
report comes in. The only safe course is to send the physical copy of the publication
round. Whether law publishers who insist on this are acting in their long-term inter-
ests is for them to consider. In the short term, it seems poor customer relations for
very little payback. In times when budgetary concerns affect law firms, they may
very well make decisions on which publisher they want to deal with, depending on
who gives them the best service and the least hassle. They may ditch those domi-
nated by bean-counter mentality.
Legally, publishers may not be able to object to the copying of the above items in
all circumstances.
Canada has no specific exemption in the Copyright Act allowing lawyers to copy
material for use in court or before tribunals. Other countries do have exemptions
like this, and the Phase 2 of Canada's copyright reform may well have some such ex-
emption. Exemptions like this have been broadly interpreted. In a New Zealand case
last year, a court said that lawyers could have a transcript made of a television pro-
gramme when one of their clients wanted legal advice about whether the programme
had defamed him. The judge said a copyright exemption allowing copying "for the
purposes of judicial proceedings" went beyond cases where litigation had actually
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commenced; it included cases where the material was "required to be reproduced"
for legal advisers properly to advise a client to start litigation or to defend threat-
ened litigation (Television New Zealand v. Newsmonitor Services Ltd, (1993) 27 1.P.R.
441, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 91, 109-110.)
Lawyers probably already have some exemption like this in Canada, even if the
Copyright Act does not expressly say so. Before appointment to the bench, all judges
photocopied legal material in the course of their law practices. It is hard to imagine
any now deciding that a long-standing open custom accepted within the profession
and the judiciary is somehow legally suspect. Copyright is subservient to general
public policy, and one important policy is the due administration of justice. In prac-
tice, this means at least that law reports, extracts from legal texts, journals or other
books can be copied for inclusion in briefs and binders for use in court.
Lawyers should also be able to copy material fairly when researching legal points
for their clients, although the lawyer shouldn't copy more than is reasonably neces-
sary for the purpose; in practice, she should be given fair leeway. When going to
court, the lawyer has, as an officer of the court, the obligation to produce not only
the authorities that support her but also those that do not; if she is entitled to in-
clude those materials in her brief and binder of authorities, then she should have
similar leeway in giving the legal advice on which a client may or may not end up
going to court.
This may, quite apart from any public policy defence, be part of the fair dealing ex-
emption in section 27(2) of the Copyright Act:
"The following acts do not constitute an infringement of copyright:
(a) any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private study or re-
search;
(a.1) any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of criticism, review or
newspaper summary, if (i) the source, and (ii) the author's name, if given
in the source, are mentioned."
Most law librarians sometime have had (or will have) the experience of trying to
figure out for themselves what "fair dealing" means in a particular instance. They
soon hit a mental brick wall, and go to some lawyer or self-proclaimed copyright ex-
pert to find what light they can shed on the subject.
The exercise is a bit like the apocryphal occasion earlier this century where the
smart-mouth English lawyer F.E. Smith (later Lord Chancellor Birkenhead) was ar-
guing an appeal before a judge of moderate ability. The judge was having difficulty
understanding the subtleties of'Smith's argument. Finally, when Smith had finished
and sat down, the judge said to him: "Well, Mr. Smith, having heard your argument, I
am not one bit the wiser now than I was when you started." Smith stood up and, fix-
ing the judge with his iciest smile, replied: "No doubt, my Lord, but at least a great
deal better informed." That's pretty close to the state of mind of anyone who has
tried to give or receive advice on what amounts to fair dealing, except they end up
being neither much wiser nor much better informed than when they started. For they
will find that what amounts to fair dealing is said to be a question of fact depending
on the circumstances of the individual case, and what may be thought to be fair in
one case may, if the circumstances are just a little different, be thought unfair in an-
other.
The trouble is that lawmakers since the beginning of the century got tired of try-
ing to work out, except at the broadest level, what conduct should be treated as ac-
ceptable, so they threw the matter over to copyright owners and users to agree on;
if they didn't agree, they could go to court and get a ruling from a judge on whether
what they were doing was fair or not. In effect, the legislature delegated its respon-
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sibility to make laws to judges. In Canada, few people have wanted to go to court to
test the law. The action has been mainly in England and more so in the U.S. Lawyers
and judges in Canada like their precedents as much as anyone else, so the danger is
that Canada's fair dealing laws will be decided for us by British or U.S. judges, even
though our social circumstances and aspirations may be different.
This danger does not exist in the decision of the Ontario provincial court's deci-
sion in R. v. Laurier Office Mart Inc., the case of the Ottawa copyshop case charged
with criminal copyright infringement, which I mentioned earlier. Professors from the
University of Ottawa would tell their class that course materials could be obtained
from the copyshop and the students would buy copies directly from the copyshop.
In one case, the professor had 80 or 90 copies made and sold them directly at cost
to the students. According to the judge, "None of the materials comprising the works
were authored by any of the professors who testified and none of the professors had
been aware then of any copyright issues or had obtained any permissions to copy."
(These professors must have forsaken the ivory tower for hermetically sealed
caves.)
Now even a civil copyright case is rarely straightforward. In cases that matter -
and most that get as far as court do - high-priced lawyers are usually hired to nit-
pick their way over the minutiae of the CopyrightAct and its case law, and try to blind
one another, and any judge with the ill fortune to have to hear the case, with quasi-
science. It is true that, in most areas of the law, one can think of almost any idiotic
proposition, and some judge sometime somewhere has said it. Canada can fairly
claim to be up there with the world leaders on this score, but it's a close call. One of
my favourites is the recent case in the federal Court of Appeal where a judge said
that the reason sports games had no copyright protection was because one could
bet on their outcome; unlike, he said, Swan Lake where nobody lays bets on what
will happen to the swan. (The judge had obviously not been recently to any avant
garde or amateur performance of Swan Lake, where it is sometimes touch and go
whether the swan will finish up by slugging it out with the audience.) So the new test
of copyrightability is: if you can bet on the outcome, it's not copyrightable; if you
can't, it is. (FWS Joint Sports Claimants v. Copyright Board (1991) 36 C.P.R.(3d) 483,
489-90.) Improvisers, beware!
The game in copyright then is to find the propositions that favour one's case, and
try to persuade a bemused judge that this or another piece of foolishness actually is
the law, and that he or she must apply it.
If this is true of the civil law, it is even more true of the criminal law. Not many crim-
inal copyright charges are laid in Canada, except in pretty obvious cases. People run-
ning basement operations copying video or audio recordings or computer software
with 20 high-speed dubbing machines don't have many legal defences going for them
these days. "I didn't know I needed permission from anyone" doesn't sound too con-
vincing when you are operating in the dead of night behind closed doors in the base-
ment and selling through bars, under the counter or out the trunk of a car. For those
who want to trot out a few defences, prosecutors have been provided by the sound
recording industry - and probably other industries - with briefing books that
show them step-by-step what evidence they need to collect before they get to court
and how to present it. I don't know whether there is a prosecutor's briefing book for
prosecuting infringement of published books or periodicals, but if there was, either
it wasn't precisely followed or the book itself didn't anticipate all the problems that
might arise in this type of case.
In an ordinary civil infringement case, the plaintiff has to show (a) it is the owner
of copyright; (b) the work's author qualified for copyright in Canada (i.e., the work
was first made or published in Canada or a Berne or Univeral Copyright Convention
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country or the author is a national of one of those countries); (c) the defendant in-
fringed by doing something only the copyright owner is authorized to do - copying,
publicly performing, broadcasting, etc.; and (d) the copyright owner had not autho-
rized the defendant to do that.
The defendant can contest any of those elements:
- If you say you're the owner, show me your title documents.
- How do I know the author comes from a Berne or UCC country or the work was
first published there?
- I didn't infringe: what I took was not the owner's, and anyway, I took only a little
bit.
- Someone else, not me, did the infringing.
- Even admitting the plaintiff's initial claims, I am entitled to do what I did because
I was dealing fairly with the work, or I have some other privilege given me under
the Copyright Act or at common law.
- The plaintiff is barred from suing me because it knew what I was doing for a long
time and acquiesced in it, or didn't give me notice that I couldn't do any longer
what I have been known to have been doing for a long time without let or hin-
drance.
- The plaintiff hasn't lost anything anyway and I haven't gained anything by the in-
fringement, so I don't have to pay any money for the infringement.
- Any combination of the above.
In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove all a plaintiff has to in a civil case
(except the quantum of monetary relief), and more:
First, it has to show the defendant had a guilty mind. For criminal offences, the
Copyright Act says nobody is guilty unless he or she "knowingly" sells or distributes
infringing copies. It is not a criminal offence to make an infringing copy: only to sell
or distribute it to make money off it. And then the seller must know he was infring-
ing; he knew he was doing something wrong and went ahead anyway. The drunk-out-
of-his-mind copier apparently is innocent here, as the Supreme Court has said he is
in other areas of the law.
Secondly, in civil cases, a plaintiff has to prove everything on a balance of proba-
bilities. If something is more likely than not, then it is proved. In criminal law, every-
one knows that proof of every element of an offence must be beyond a reasonable
doubt. In criminal law, you must be very sure, because a person's liberty and repu-
tation are at stake; in the civil law, it's enough to be fairly sure because it's only all
about money. A statistical analogy: in the criminal law, you have to be 99% sure; in
the civil law, 51% will do.
Thirdly, in civil cases, defences like fair dealing are the defendant's responsibility.
The plaintiff does not have to show the defendant hasn't dealt fairly; the defence is
a defendant's privilege. She or he has to show why what would otherwise be an in-
fringement isn't one. The same might not apply to criminal law. What the defence has
to prove in a civil case, in a criminal prosecution the prosecutor may have to dis-
prove.
How did all this work out in R. v. Laurier Office Mart Inc.? The judge tossed out
some of the arguments for acquittal the copyshop made. So, the prosecution had to
show the copyshop "exposed or offered for sale" infringing works. The copyshop
said they weren't exposed or offered for sale because they weren't lying around
available for all to see in the copyshop. This sounds right, although the judge didn't
agree: he said the copies were "exposed" because the professors had told the stu-
dents they were there.
The judge was on stronger ground when she said that, in any event, the defendant
was "offering the copies for sale". The defence argued that shops hardly ever make
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offers for sale: they only invite buyers to make offers to buy. Sellers then accept
those offers by taking the order or ringing up the price of the item and taking the buy-
er's money. This argument might work in Britain even today: there is a famous Eng-
lish case in which a court said that a flick-knife displayed in a shop window was not
"offered for sale"; the store was only inviting buyers to make offers to buy. In Britain,
therefore, no shop could ever be convicted of offering flick-knives for sale, because
no offer to sell ever occurred. Happily, the Canadian judge was not overwhelmed by
this nonsense. Whatever the position might be in the civil law of contract, she said
the criminal law context was different: sellers who held themselves out as willing to
take orders were offering to sell the goods.
The judge nevertheless ended up acquitting the copyshop for a number of reasons.
First, the defendant was not shown to have infringed "knowingly". The professors
said they didn't think they were doing anything wrong. The copyshop didn't believe
it either, at least until the police seized their works. It had since taken out a licence
with CANCOPY. The shop may have been wrong but it did not act recklessly or with
wilful blindness. The CANCOPY representative admitted in evidence that the copy-
shop "still does not seem to grasp a lot of issues and has a lot of questions". With
that, everyone (including, no doubt, the judge) can certainly empathize.
Secondly, the prosecution had not proved some of the works had copyright. What
happened was this. There is a copyright register in Hull where one can register own-
ership of copyright. Suppose one owns copyright in a book one has written called
Great Copyright Bores I Have Known. One can register oneself as owner of that copy-
right upon paying the Registrar of Copyright some money. If you ever need to sue
anybody for infringement, all you have to do is produce that certificate in court and
it is evidence that copyright exists in the work and you are its owner. The defendant
then has to disprove these facts. If it doesn't lead any convincing evidence to chal-
lenge them, then copyright and ownership will be found proved.
The prosecution produced certificates for all the works for which charges had
been laid. However, some certificates were obtained after the offences occurred.
This doesn't matter in a civil case, but here the judge said it did. She thought just be-
cause copyright existed on the day the certificate was issued didn't mean it existed
on the offence date: at least this wasn't proved beyond a reasonable doubt. She also
said she wasn't satisfied that copyright was held by the owner named in the certifi-
cate. The first reason makes no sense: if a work had copyright in November 1994, it
must have also had copyright in July 1993, although its ownership may have
changed. But the judge was right on the second point. For certificates issued before
the offence date, she therefore found copyright proved; but for certificates issued
later, she found copyright not proved and dismissed those charges.
Thirdly, the prosecution had to prove the copyright owners had not consented to
the photocopying of their works. The professors had not got any permission from
anybody. The only evidence that the copyright owners had not consented came
from a CANCOPY employee, who gave evidence that CANCOPY represented the
copyright owners and that it had not given permission. But CANCOPY presented no
documents showing what rights the copyright owners had given it and therefore
how it could validly give consent for them. So, again, the judge said this element had
not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This seems right. We know the profes-
sors did not seek permission to copy but we do not know whether or not the copy-
right owners cared if copying occurred. A copyright owner who is indifferent about
whether his work is copied can be taken to have consented to the copying.
Fourthly, infringement was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The professors
had said only that chapters or portions of books or articles had been copied. No-
body had produced the works from which the material had been extracted, so the
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judge didn't know whether the whole work that had copyright had been taken, or
whether the parts taken were substantial, when compared with the whole work.
Fifthly, "fair dealing" had not been disproved. In a civil case; the defendant has to
show fair dealing; but in a prosecution, the prosecutor has to prove the defendant
had not dealt fairly with the works.
Some final comments: it is easy to think about copyright merely as it affects us in
our daily working lives, but it is just as, probably more, important to think about
what copyright should be doing more generally in our culture. The institution of
copyright has grown haphazardly; it seems to apply to far too much trivia, it impedes
activities many people find inoffensive, and it enables the making of extravagant
claims that ultimately line the pockets of distributors much more than they help the
initial producers of work. In Canada, copyright has become degraded to the point
where almost everything written down, drawn or recorded in some form can be pro-
tected. This is overprotection par excellence: people would still produce much of the
same work even if there was no or less protection than the law currently allows them
to claim. Some stimulus and protection no doubt need to be offered in some sectors
to encourage the production of goods that can easily be appropriated and where the
producer has not had an opportunity of earning a fair return for his or her labours.
When copyright starts applying beyond this justification, it loses its moral authority
and legitimacy. If copyright law is to deserve respect, it must appeal to the sense of
fairness of its public, the people daily affected by it as both users and owners. I
doubt this moral centre exists today. The challenge is to re-create copyright so it re-
gains its moral authority, without which it cannot thrive and without which, frankly,
it does not deserve to exist.
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Vulnerable claimants can quickly squan-
der their awards and are easily taken
advantage of by friends and relatives. A
structured settlement would have shielded
the award from any claims and provided a
lifetime of secure, tax free income. With
no fee or obligation, we can show you
how a structured settlement could fit the
needs of your client.
STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS INC
Suite 522 - 625 Howe Street, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6C 2T6
Phone: 688-7791 Fax: 688-7792 Toll Free: 1-800-299-7791
Licensed Insurance Agent Specializing in Structured Settlements
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